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The Unemployment Effects of 
Minimum Wages 
 
 
Gary S. Fields 
Cornell University, USA and DELTA, Paris 
 
Introduction 
This article summarizes the results of a more technical paper [1] on the unemployment effects of a minimum wage or 
other institutionally-imposed wage floors. By definition, a “wage floor” is the lowest wage that any employer may pay or 
that any worker may receive. The wage floor may be caused by unions engaging in collective bargaining and raising the 
wages of their members; governments paying their employees higher wages than they might earn elsewhere; or some 
other institutional intervention. The type of wage floor analysed in this article is a minimum wage set by the Government 
above the level that would otherwise have been determined by supply and demand. 
Figures 1 and 2 present the familiar standard textbook-level diagram of the labour market effects of a minimum wage. 
This model produces several conclusions: 
 A minimum wage causes unemployment. In Figure 1, compare the unemployment when the wage is W1 or W2 
with the full employment when the wage is at the market-clearing level W*. Nearly all labour economics 
textbooks contain this result. 
 An increase in the minimum wage induces more labour to move into the covered sector. This is implicit in the 
upward-sloping labour supply curve. 
 The higher the minimum wage, the more unemployment there will be. Unemployment is L1 - E1 when the 
minimum wage is W1 and L2 - E2 > L1 - E1 when the minimum wage is W2 > W1 
 For any given minimum wage, the more elastic the demand for labour, the larger is unemployment. In Figure 2, 
demand curve D2 is more elastic than curve D1. For a given minimum wage W’ and given labour supply curve S, 
the model says that unemployment is greater for curve D2 (L’ - E2) than for curve D1 (L’ – E1). 
 
The preceding conclusions derive from a one-sector model which implicitly assumes that the minimum wage applies 
uniformly to everyone. But empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In a study covering both industrialized and developing 
countries, Starr [2] reported that the self-employed, service workers, and farm workers are typically excluded from 
minimum wage coverage. Ashenfelter and Smith [3] found high rates of non-compliance with minimum wages in the 
United States. Brazil and Mexico regularly report their wage distributions using the categories “less than minimum wage", 
“one to two minimum wages", etc.[4] and so on. 
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Figure 1: The Unemployment Effects of Alternative Minimum Wages  
 
Figure 2: The Unemployment Effects of Alternative Labour Demand Curves 
 
Because coverage and compliance with minimum wages are far from universal, a better stylization than a single-sector 
model would be a two-sector model, one sector with minimum wage coverage and the other without it. Accordingly, two-
sector models consisting of a high-wage sector, a low-wage sector, and possible mobility between the two form the basis 
of the present analysis. Such models were originated by Harris and Todaro [5] and Harberger [6] in the context of dualistic 
labour markets in developing countries, and were subsequently used by Mincer [7] and Gramlich [8] to analyse the 
economics of minimum wages in an economy with covered and non-covered sectors. 
At first, the results from the two-sector model seemed to support those of the one-sector model. Mincer concluded 
that “...the unemployment rate induced by the imposition of minimum wages is proportional to the percentage wage gap 
(w) between the sectors...”[7] Harris and Todaro[5] also led readers to believe that the higher the minimum wage, the 
more unemployment there would be in equilibrium[9]. Mincer [7] reached another conclusion: that a minimum wage will 
have a smaller effect on unemployment the less elastic the demand for labour in the covered sector. 
The results that follow are less clear-cut. I work with special cases of the more general two-sector model and perform 
comparative static analysis of the unemployment effects of minimum wages for three parameters of interest: 
1. the elasticity of demand for labour in the covered sector; 
 3 
 
2. the elasticity of the wage in the non-covered sector labour force; and 
3. the size of the minimum wage. 
I show that for none of these parameters is the comparative static effect unidirectional. If special cases of a model give 
opposing results, the comparative statics must be ambiguous in the general model. Claims in the existing literature of 
unambiguous comparative static effects cannot therefore be correct [10]. 
The Two-sector Model 
The two-sector model features wage dualism and unemployment. It is assumed that risk-neutral workers choose their 
labour market strategies in order to maximize the mathematical expectation of their wages, i.e. the wage adjusted for the 
probability of employment. The covered and non-covered sectors are assumed to be disjoint in the sense that those 
working in one sector have no chance of gaining employment in the other sector unless they move there; on- the-job 
search is ruled out. Any temporary differential between expected wages in the two sectors will be eliminated by 
intersectoral migration. Thus, in equilibrium, expected wages are equalized across sectors: 
 
Firms’ demand for labour curves are assumed to be inverse functions of the wage in the sector in question. Following the 
established literature, labour demand in one sector is assumed to be independent of wages in the other sector. 
Prior to the minimum wage, competition in the labour market equalizes wages in the two sectors at a level denoted by 
W0. ECO workers are employed in the covered sector and the remaining L - ECO members of the labour force are employed 
in the non-covered sector. 
When a minimum wage is imposed on some sectors of the economy but not others, the wage in the covered sector is 
raised by 𝛾 per cent: 
 
where 𝛾= ( WC - WO)/ WO. This lowers employment in the covered sector by 𝜂𝛾  per cent, where 𝜂  is the (arc) wage 
elasticity of demand for labour in the covered sector evaluated between WO and WC : 
 
The reduction in employment in the covered sector and the higher wage there will affect the expected wage in that 
sector. Workers will reallocate themselves so that the expected wages in the two sectors are again equalized. 
To find how the labour force is divided among employment in the various labour market sectors and unemployment 
following the imposition of a minimum wage, we need a rule to determine how the covered sector jobs are allocated 
among those who seek them. These models deal with the case of probabilistic hiring, i.e. the probability of employment 
 4 
 
in the covered sector is ' expressed as the ratio of covered sector employment (Ec) to covered sector labour force (Lc), 
including both employed and unemployed. Thus 
 
The wage in the non-covered sector, WN, is assumed to adjust to clear the market, so that the supply of non-covered 
sector workers and the number demanded in that sector are equal. Thus, the equilibrium condition becomes 
 
The total labour force is the sum of the covered and non-covered sector labour forces: 
  
Unemployment (U) is defined as 
 
Combining equations, we obtain 
 
The model is not yet closed, because WN has not yet been specified. I do this by working with alternative special cases 
of the general model. 
The first special case, called Model I, assumes that the wage in the noncovered sector is invariant with respect to the 
size of that sector’s labour force. This assumption would be realistic for a traditional agricultural sector in a land-
abundant economy in which anyone who wants can find a plot of land, till it, and earn the same amount as others in that 
sector already earn. It also would be a reasonable approximation of an economy in which the covered sector is very 
small relative to the non-covered sector so that, within the relevant range, any outflows of labour from the non-covered 
sector or inflows to it leave the wage in that sector effectively unchanged. Precisely this assumption has been made by 
a number of authors who have extended the Harris-Todaro model [5] including Fields [11], Anand and Joshi [12], Heady 
[13], Stiglitz [14], Sah and Stiglitz [15], and Bell [16], among others. Hence in Model I: 
 
A different simplifying assumption defines Model II: total wages in the noncovered sector are assumed not to change 
with the size of that sector’s labour force. This could happen in the classic labour surplus situation of the type modelled 
by Lewis [17] and Fei and Ranis [18], in which labour in the noncovered sector has zero marginal product, and instead is 
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paid its average product. If we denote the total fixed output in the non-covered sector by Q, then, under the average 
product rule, the wage in the non-covered sector is 
 
This same expression can be derived in a very different way. Suppose labour is not in surplus and that the production 
function is given by QN = Φ(KN lnLN. If KN and PN, the price of the product, are fixed over the relevant range, then the marginal 
product is 𝜕𝑄 N/𝜕𝐿 N = Φ (KN)/LN and the value of the marginal product of labour in the non-covered sector equals 
PN Φ(KN)/LN Denoting PN Φ(KN)/LN by Q and equating the value of marginal product to the wage, we obtain 
WN = Q/LN 
which is of the same form as (10) but derived very differently. 
We thus have two special cases of the general two-sector model: Model I, consisting of equations (1)-(8) and (9), and 
Model II, consisting of (1)-(8) and (10). We turn now to the comparative static results in these two models. 
Results of the Model 
Five results follow. Intuitive explanations are stated here (see Fields [1] for the proofs). 
The Effect of a Minimum Wage on Unemployment 
Proposition 1: A minimum wage causes unemployment. 
A quick look at the equilibrium condition (5) makes this clear: WC > WN implies that EC/Lc < 1. That is, Lc workers supply 
their labour to the covered sector, but only EC are employed; the rest are unemployed. 
The Direction of Labour Movement 
Proposition 2. A sector-specific minimum wage induces movement of labour out of the covered sector if the demand for 
labour in the covered sector is sufficiently elastic, and into the covered sector if the demand for labour is sufficiently 
inelastic. Credit for this result is due to Mincer [7], although Harris and Todaro [5] and Corden and Findlay [19] had raised 
the issue earlier. 
This implies that the standard textbook mode is misleading when it assumes that the supply curve of labour to the 
covered sector is always upward-sloping. Proposition 2 can be seen by rewriting (8) as 
  
If the term in parentheses is greater than 1, then WNLC must increase as a result of the minimum wage, which can happen 
only if labour moves into the covered sector. By similar reasoning, if the term in parentheses is less than one, labour must 
be moving out of the covered sector. It can be verified that this will happen as   𝜂 >=<  −
1
1+γ
. 
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Elasticity of Demand for Labour in the Covered Sector 
Proposition 3: Given a minimum wage and an elasticity of wage in the noncovered sector with respect to the size of that 
sector’s labour force, a greater elasticity of demand for labour in the covered sector may result either in less 
unemployment or in more unemployment in equilibrium, depending on parameter values. 
A more elastic demand for labour in the covered sector results in less unemployment in Model I. Looking at (5), if WC 
and WN are constant, a larger reduction in EC implies an even larger reduction in LC and thus a reduction in unemployment. 
The opposite result may be derived in Model II. By choosing appropriate parameter values, it can be shown that a more 
elastic demand for labour might result in more unemployment. An example appears in Fields [1]. 
Because these are special cases of the same general model, the general model itself necessarily has ambiguous 
comparative static effects, as stated in Proposition 3. 
Elasticity of the Wage in the Non-covered Sector with Respect to the Non-covered Sector Labour Force 
When a minimum wage is imposed, the wage in the non-covered sector will change inversely with the size of that sector’s 
labour force when either: (1) employers in that sector have downward-sloping labour demand curves, or (2) the sector 
consists of self-employed workers whose marginal products are smaller than their average products. The comparative 
static question is when will the unemployment resulting from the wage floor be higher - when the wage in the non-covered 
sector is relatively elastic or relatively inelastic with respect to the size of the non-covered sector labour force? In answer, 
we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: Given a minimum wage and an elasticity of demand for labour in the covered sector, a greater elasticity of 
the wage in the non-covered sector with respect to the size of that sector’s labour force may result either in more 
unemployment or in less unemployment in equilibrium, depending on parameter values. 
The intuition for this result is that when the minimum wage induces movement of labour into the covered sector, then, 
the more the wage in the noncovered sector rises as people move out, the smaller will be the gain from moving, and so 
the smaller will be the number of people who do so. This means that fewer people will be seeking a given number of 
covered sector jobs, and therefore the lower unemployment in equilibrium. But, if conditions are such that the minimum 
wage induces movement of labour into the non-covered sector, then the more the wage in the non-covered sector falls 
as people move in, the smaller the gain from moving. As a result, more people will stay in the covered sector and fewer 
people will move into the non-covered sector, which causes unemployment to be higher in equilibrium. Unemployment 
can be higher or lower because the more elastic the non-covered sector wage with respect to the size of that sector’s 
labour force, the more moderate the response of unemployment to the minimum wage. 
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Size of the Minimum Wage 
Proposition 5: Other things being equal, a higher minimum wage may result either in more unemployment in equilibrium 
or in less unemployment in equilibrium, depending on parameter values. 
More unemployment would assuredly arise if a higher minimum wage causes both an increase in the quantity of labour 
supplied to the covered sector and a decrease in the quantity of labour demanded. As stated in Proposition 2, the quantity 
of labour supplied to the covered sector will rise provided that the demand for labour in the covered sector is sufficiently 
inelastic. But if that is not the case, a higher minimum wage can reduce the amount of labour supplied to the covered 
sector. If the demand for labour in the covered sector is elastic enough, so many jobs may be lost and so many job-seekers 
discouraged that unemployment may actually decrease. The requisite elasticity condition and an illustrative example 
appear in Fields [1]. 
Thus, contrary to the textbook labour market model, we find that a higher minimum wage can result either in more 
unemployment in equilibrium or in less unemployment in equilibrium, depending on parameter values. 
Conclusion 
This article has discussed several theoretical ambiguities which arise when a minimum wage applies to part but not all of 
a country’s labour market. Because theoretical reasoning alone does not suffice to determine whether unemployment 
will increase or decrease in response to a change in the minimum wage or in other parameters of interest, empirical 
estimates are needed. But it would be a mistake to try to estimate the parameters of the simple two-sector model shown 
earlier. Empirical analysis for the real world must be based on a more refined model which allows for such additional 
labour market phenomena as job fixity, heterogeneous labour, preferential hiring, and on-the- job search, all in a multi-
period context. 
While much more remains to be worked out, what we can say at this point is that the predictions derived from the 
textbook model definitely do not carry over to the two-sector case. Therefore, since a non-covered sector exists nearly 
everywhere, the predictions of the textbook model simply cannot be relied on. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that one’s views about the desirability of a minimum wage ought to depend on more 
than the size of the unemployment effect alone. A thoroughgoing welfare economic analysis is needed. Looking at the 
literature, one is struck by how seldom this is even attempted. 
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